sification model emphasizes a set of crops that can The marginal benefit and cost of diversification for be grown from the same initial set of fixed resources. Florida orange producers is analyzed using certainty Gross margins are often used to calculate the optimal equivalents. Results indicate that for moderate and set of crops. However, diversification often will not high levels of risk aversion, diversification into occur unless there is an increase in at least some strawberry, grapefruit, or additional orange producfixed resources. For example, a corn farmer would tion is not optimal. However, moderately risk averse find it necessary to obtain a different header for the Florida orange producers can gain by diversifying combine before diversification into soybeans could into grapefruit production if the annual amortized occur. The traditional method used for diversificafixed costs can be reduced by as little as 10 percent.
risk management technique is enterprise diversifica-MEAN-VARIANCE CRITERION tion. At the firm level, the manager tries to control Under certain assumptions, the mean-variance production and price risk by producing a combinacriterion is related to the expected utility hypothesis. tion or portfolio of enterprises.
This linkage can be exploited to derive the certainty A common approach used to evaluate diversificaequivalent of an investment opportunity. The foltion opportunities involves the mean-variance eflowing derivation is based on the results of Robison ficiency criterion. This criterion states that an asset and Barry, where the objective of a mean-variance is inefficient or dominated if another asset can model can be interpreted as the certainty equivalent. produce the same or higher rate of return for a lower This derivation formalizes the assumptions necesvariance of return (Markowitz; Anderson et al.) . In sary for this linkage to hold in empirical work. diversification, a single asset is constructed by comAt the basic level, the mean-variance criterion has bining two or more individual assets. Several studies a limited theoretical basis. The mean-variance have shown diversification to be a useful tool in criterion reduces a set of all possible investments to managing risk (Heady; Jones; Freund) . a smaller set of risk-efficient investments. Without However, past applications of the mean-variance additional assumptions, there is little or no guarantee criterion have often failed to consider the marginal that this efficient set of investments contains the costs and marginal benefits of additional diversificautility-maximizing choice. The usual assumption tion (Adams et al.; Schurle and Erven) . In the required for equivalence between the mean-variance agricultural finance literature, the typical crop diverset and the utility-maximizing set of investments is thatreturns are distributed normally. To calculate the a certainty equivalent has no variance, otherwise it certainty equivalents, Freunds' more stringent aswould not be certain. To find the certainty sumptions that returns are distributed multivariate equivalent, a utility function is set equal to the level normal and that the agent's utility function is a of expected utility of a risky alternative. Because a negative exponential are also required.
certain outcome has no variance, I(X) is equal to Formally, a negative exponential utility function expected utility (Z). For any set of assumptions in can be specified as which expected utility is maximized by maximizing (3), Z defines the certainty equivalent. (1) U [W(X) ] =-exp [-0W(X) I X eI 0 , THE MARGINAL BENEFIT AND COST OF where wealth (W) is a function of an investment ADDITIONALDIVERSIFICATION bundle (X), 0 is the Pratt-Arrow absolute risk aver-A change in the feasible set can be used to derive sion coefficient, and Io is the set of feasible investthe marginal benefit and cost from additional diverment bundles. Wealth is generated by investing in sification opportunities. Once the risky investment the feasible bundle X, and if the returns on X are opportunity is expressed in terms of a certainty multivariate normal, then W(X) -N[(X), &2(X)] equivalent, standard concepts of deterministic conBussey has shown that under this specification, the sumer behavior become applicable. For example, expected utility of the negative exponential is given that preferencesaremonotonically increasing~~~e quivalent to ~in wealth, a consumer will always prefer morẽ~~~~~e quivalent to ~wealth.
Therefore, the consumer will prefer an alter-0 -2 (X native with a higher certainty equivalent. The cer-
. tainty equivalent includes an adjustment for risk '~~2 ~preferences. Hence, the agent, in choosing an investment with the greater certainty equivalent, is conChoosing the vector of activities, X, to maximize sidering his or her risk preference. If a consumer is expected utility in (2) yields the same solution as faced with two risky alternatives and the certainty choosing X to maximize equivalent of the first is greater than the certainty equivalent of the second, the agent will prefer the (3) Z = g(X) -0& 2 (X) first. Further, the maximum price that agents will 2 pay for the first, given that they already have the second, is the difference in the certainty equivalents. because (2) ia a monotonic transformation of (3).
Because the marginal benefit can be defined as the In addition to yielding thesame maximum, thereby most an agent is willing to pay for an item, the simplifying the process of finding the utility maximarginal benefit of the additional diversification mizing portfolio, (2) also allows calculation of the opportunity is the change in certainty equivalents. certainty equivalent for a risky investment. The cerctainty equivalent forissimply investment.he certainlevelof Mean-variance studies typically have examined tainty equivalent is simplythecertainlevelofwealth diversification based on gross margins (returns for which the decision-maker is indifferent with minus variable costs, Adams et al) . Incremental respect to a risky alternative. To compute the certainfixed costs play an important role in determining the ty equivalent for a risky opportunity, an expenditure desirability of diversification. These incremental function or inverse utility function is set equal to fixed costs constitute the marginal costs of diverexpected utility. Specifically, we are interested in sification, which are often not considered. The mardetermining the certainty equivalent, W*(X), that ginal costs of diversification can be determined by yields the same level of utility as E(U[W(X) ]}.
calculating the net present value of the incremental Substituting W*(X) for W(X) in (1) and solving for fixed costs and amortizing those costs over the life W*(X) yields the certainty equivalent of the investment. The amortized fixed costs can be (4) W*(X) = 1 WE either subtracted from the mean return ( g) in (2) or 0(4) i (E= l (EU [W(X)] ) )compared directly with the marginal benefit defined Substituting (2) into (4) and simplifying, the cerabove. If the marginal incremental fixed costs are tainty equivalent is subtracted from (2), then the investment would be (5) W*(X) = (X -0 (X).
desirable when the marginal benefit is positive.
() W (X)= ()-').
It may not be appropriate to subtract the fixed The certainty equivalent of a risky investment is costs of diversification from the returns above variequal to the objective function, Z. The above derivaable costs given the lumpiness of an investment A tion also has a heuristic explanation. By definition, solution for a risk programming problem often involves a fraction of an activity. However, the costs Average yields for white grapefruit and on-tree of obtaining fixed facilities are often not proportionprices forFlorida white grapefruitbetween 1973 and al. For example, if an investment requires special-1987 wereobtainedfrom Florida Agricultural Statisized equipment, the average costs of obtaining the tics (1988a). The variable cost of producing one acre equipment for the first acre may be different from of oranges or grapefruit was assumed to be $748.15 the cost for multiple acres. Extrapolating the results (Murraro) , and all returns were deflated using the may yield incorrect diversification recommendapersonal consumption expenditure component of the tions. Thus, whether or not the investment is conimplicit GNP deflator. The marginal cost of diversidered divisible helps to determine whether or not sification, which is the rental rate for an acre of fixed costs can be subtracted from variable costs. oranges or grapefruit, was $630 (Hunt) . The returns to strawberries were computed based on state average prices and yields (Florida Agricul-APPLICATIONS tural Statistics, 1988b berries also had the highest standard deviation. December, February, and April. The Florida DepartApril-produced Valencia oranges had the lowest ment of Citrus provided FCOJ prices in dollars per standard deviation per acre. The correlation matrix pound solid. The yield, in pounds of solids per acre, of returns for oranges, strawberries, and grapefruit for each marketing period was derived from the state is reported in Table 2 . The returns from oranges average, measured in boxes of oranges per acre, for harvested during different periods were highly corearly and midseason oranges in the December and related. Grapefruit and strawberry returns were less February marketing periods, and Valencia oranges correlated with oranges. in the April marketing period (Florida Agricultural A mean-variance model was constructed using the Statistics, 1988a). The yield variability of FCOJ means, variances, and covariances. The objective of depends not only on tree yields, but also on the the mean-variance model was to maximize (3) subquality of the oranges. Quality of oranges is ject to the constraint that total acres of oranges raised measured by the gallons ofjuice that can be obtained were less than or equal to 150. Six Pratt-Arrow from a box. The variety of the orange and weather coefficients of absolute risk aversion ranging from are primary factors in determining this quality, zero to 0.0001 were used. Individuals with a zero risk aversion coefficient were profit maximizers.
one in which the certainty equivalent was less than Farmers with a risk aversion coefficient of 0.000005 the lowest outcome, suggesting this as an upper limit were slightly risk averse. Producers with a risk averon risk aversion. sion coefficient of 0.00001 or 0.00002 were The base scenario results are presented in the top moderately risk averse, while producers with a coefblock of Table 3 . The base scenario provides the ficient of 0.00005 or 0.0001 were strongly risk orange producer with the optimalplan for the current averse. The risk aversion levels were chosen based 150 acres. For the producer with risk aversion coefon Raskin and Cochran and on the certainty ficients less than or equal to .00001, midseason equivalent. When the certainty equivalent drops (February) maturing oranges should have been below the lowest observed outcome, the risk averraised on the 150 acres. Farmers with a risk aversion sion coefficient is likely too high. The most risk coefficient of 0.00002 should have raised both midaverse coefficient examined (0.0001) was the only season oranges and Valencia (April) oranges. a Expansion would not occur because the marginal cost of expansion exceeds the marginal benefit of expansion. The marginal cost and the marginal benefit of expansion are zero in these cases in actuality because diversification does not take place.
Farmers who had a risk aversion coefficient greater than 10. Strawberries offered potential for increasthan 0.00005 should have grown only Valencia ing the expected utility of the farmer if the farmer's oranges.
risk aversion coefficient was less than or equal to 0.00002. The marginal benefit of diversification (the Oranges and Strawberries difference in certainty equivalents between the base The results from the risk programming model for plan and augmented plan) into strawberries was diversification into strawberries are presented in the $10,993 for the zero risk aversion coefficient, second block of Table 3 . The objective function was $7,230 for 0.000005, $3,467 for 0.00001, and altered to allow for the addition of strawberry $1,387 for 0.00002. The annual amortized fixed cost production. An additional constraint was added, of diversifying into strawberries was $6,574. Thererestricting the number of acres of strawberries to less fore, only those producers who were risk-neutral or 195 those with a Pratt-Arrow absolute risk aversion coef-0.000005 or less would have expanded his enterprise ficient of 0.000005 should have diversified into after considering the marginal costs of diversificastrawberries. The marginal costs of diversifying tion. Although producers who were morerisk-averse would have to be cut by nearly 50 percent before the would want to diversify based on the returns over producer with a risk aversion coefficient of 0.00001 variable costs, the marginal benefits did not outwould have been willing to grow strawberries.
weigh the marginal costs. However, the more riskThose producers who were more risk averse would averse producer might have wanted to consider not have wanted to diversify into strawberries.
grapefruit, because the marginal benefit minus the marginal cost of diversification would have been Oranges and Grapefruit positive, if the marginal costs could have been The solution for the risk diversification problem reduced by between 5 and 10 percent. It should be with oranges and grapefruit is given in the third noted that the above analysis was based upon block of Table 3 . The objective function used in the statewide information and that the individual base model was altered to allow for the addition of producer is likely to have faced yields that were grapefruit production. An additional constraint was more variable. added restricting the number of acres of grapefruit to less than 50. Before considering the marginal CONCLUSION costs of diversification, for every level of risk aversion except the highest, grapefruit was raised on all This study used the certainty equivalent of a risky 50 acres. However, the marginal benefit for leasing investment derived from the objective function to the grapefruit only exceeded the marginal cost of evaluate the marginal benefits and costs of diver-$31,500 for Pratt-Arrow risk aversion coefficients sification opportunities. Specifically, this paper less than or equal to 0.000005. The orange producer recognized that the objective value from a popular who has a risk aversion coefficient of 0.00001 form of a quadratic risk (mean-variance) program-(0.00002) would have been willing to raise ming problem is equal to the certainty equivalent grapefruit if the annual rent on land were reduced by under Freund's assumptions. The change in certainty 5 percent (8 percent). Currently, the more risk averse equivalent between two mean-variance solutions, managers would not have rented the grapefruit grove one without and one with an additional diversificaand more risk-neutral managers would have. Howtion opportunity, was shown to be the marginal ever, in the current scenario no one would have benefit of the diversification opportunity. This marrented the grapefruit grove without planting and ginal benefit can be compared with the marginal maintaining all 50 acres.
cost of the opportunity to determine the economic efficiency of additional diversification.
Oranges and Oranges
h e soon fr te risk diersiatn ino Using this framework, three investment opporrThe solution for the risk diversificatin in to tunities available to Florida orange producers were production of additionalranges is gienin the evaluated: strawberry, grapefruit, and additional bottom block of Table 3 . The base model objective bottom block of Table 3 . T orange production. The results indicated that the was used with the constraint on acreage grown in-. was used with the constraint on rag n . ....... marginal benefit of diversification into any of the creased from 150 to 200 acres. The marginal benefit enterprises was exceeded by the cost for moderate for leasing the extra acreage of oranges exceeded the ris m marginal cost for the two smallest risk-aversion and high levels of risk aversion. The marginal marginal cost for the twp o smallest risk-aversion benefit to additional investment was greater than the coefficients. The producer who had a risk-aversion marginal cost of diversification for all three coefficient of 0.00001 would have rented the 50 acre enterprises for the profit maximizer and the ingrove of oranges, if the rent had been reduced by dividual with a Pratt-Arrow risk-aversion coeffipercent (the marginal cost would have needed to be cient less than 0.00001. For the moderately less than 3$)21,182). risk-averse producer, the marginal benefit of SUMMARY grapefruit production would have been greater than Ts idicated that oy the o e the marginal cost, if the costs had been reduced by The above analysis indicated that only the orange nt producer with a risk-aversion coefficient of as l as perce
